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Comparative study of the relationship between trade unions and
their members is obviously of greatest difficulty. In most countries
there is relatively little positive law either in the form of judicial de-
cisions or statutes, for the traditional and deeply rooted conception of
unions as private voluntary associations strongly discourages law mak-
ing concerning their internal affairs. Indeed, one of the dominant
themes running through all of the national reports is that in a demo-
cratic society unions should be self-governing. Although in Great
Britain there are a substantial number of court decisions, and in the
United States many decisions and now a most significant statute--the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)-the
positive law largely reinforces rather than denies this theme of union
self-government.
If one is to study the relationship between the union and the indi-
vidual member, one must look beyond the judicial decisions and
statutes to the union's own internal law. This is expressed, in the first
instance, by the union's constitution or rules; these are the union's
governing statutes which define the rights of the individual within the
union. However, examination of the texts of these documents is not
enough, for they are so overlaid with custom and reshaped by institu-
tional forces that the words may fail to reveal the rules applied in prac-
tice. One must, therefore, look to the rules and practices actually ap-
plied within the union.
This brings one to the point of the first and nearly insuperable diffi-
culty-a general ignorance of the internal life of trade unions. A pre-
occupation with the relation between unions and employers has
blunted any concern with the relation between the union and its
members. Study of the role of the union in the social process has not
been matched by similar examinations of the internal structure of union
government and its practical operation which enable us to see with any
clarity the rights of the individual within the union. The various
national reports upon which this paper is drawn have sought to go
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beyond the positive law and the formal union rules to the actual prac-
tices of unions. But they have often been handicapped by the unavail-
ability of adequate studies of union government. Any comparisons or
conclusions which might be drawn in this General Report must, there-
fore, be highly tentative and may be unintentionally distorted. Because
of these limitations, the purpose of this report is not to make careful
comparisons but rather to use the national reports to suggest the lines
along which comparisons may be meaningful. The objective here is
not to draw conclusions but rather to seek to formulate relevant ques-
tions to ask concerning the relationship between the union and its
members.
II. THE SOURCE OF OUR CONCERN WITH THE RELATION BETWEEN
A UNION AND ITS MEMBERS
The threshhold question is: Why should one be specially concerned
with the relationship between the union and its members? Why should
one inquire into the internal processes of unions any more than those
of social clubs, athletic associations, political parties or religious organ-
izations? Why should one single out unions from other voluntary asso-
ciations for separate consideration? The answer to this basic question
will inevitably determine the direction of the whole line of inquiry.
The concern with the relationship between the union and its mem-
bers has its roots in the special role which unions in a democracy per-
form in ordering society and their impact on the lives of individual
workers. First and foremost, the union engages in collective bargain-
ing. The collective agreements which it negotiates with employers
establish terms and conditions of employment which serve to regulate
the labor market. More important, the collective agreement vitally
affects, if not practically controls, the individual's employment con-
tract. In addition, the union may provide, and thereby control access
to, essential social benefits such as pensions, medical services, unem-
ployment benefits, or legal services to enforce rights relating to em-
ployment. Thus, the union, as collective bargaining representative and
otherwise, exercises substantial regulatory power over the working life
of every individual who comes within its domain. It is true that the
scope of the union's control and the tightness with which it binds the
individual differs among the various countries-a situation which shall
be explored at a later point in some detail. But in every country which
has a trade union movement worthy of the name, decisions made by
the union can affect the member as immediately and conclusively as
decisions by government itself. Thus, wages negotiated by the union
may be more important to the member than taxes levied by the govern-
ment; and denial of a pension will bring equal hardship to the indi-
vidual. In a democracy, then, the exercise by any group of such power
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over its members raises pressing questions as to the rights of members
within the organization.
Special concern with the internal processes of unions is reinforced, if
not compelled, because the union's power and control is a product of
deliberate government policy. In the labor market, regulation through
collective bargaining is consciously chosen as the alternative to govern-
ment control. In some countries such as the United States, the law
has protected the right of unions to organize in order to encourage the
process of collective bargaining, with the explicit objective of thereby
avoiding government regulation of terms and conditions of employ-
ment. In countries like Sweden, collective bargaining developed with-
out any legal protection, but it has long been heavily relied upon by
the government as an integral part of the regulation of the labor
market. Even in England where collective agreements are not legally
binding, unions and collective bargaining are considered essential in-
struments in ordering a democratic society. When the collective agree-
ment is "extended" to other employers or other employees by govern-
ment order as in France or Germany, or the majority union is certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent as in the United States, the designa-
tion of unions as instruments for governing the labor market is undis-
guised. The contract negotiated by the "representative" union is ex-
plicitly given the imprint of government, making it applicable to all
workers, union and non-union alike. Countries differ widely in the
degree to which they rely on collective bargaining, in the particular
subjects allocated to control through collective bargaining and to
direct government control, and in the various devices used to integrate
these two forms of control. But in these differing degrees and varying
forms is found the common principle that the control exercised by
unions through collective bargaining is a form of governing power
allocated to it by government in the ordering of society.
In addition, unions in many countries are recognized by government
as the representative of employees generally in the naming of official
bodies and in the developing of governmental policies. For instance,
in countries as disparate as Chile and Germany, the labor representa-
tives appointed to bodies governing social security programs are in
practice those nominated by the trade unions; in both Sweden and
Germany the unions designate lay judges for the labor courts; and in
England, wage orders establishing minimum standards must follow
the recommendations of a wage council on which an officer of the in-
terested union commonly sits as an official member. In these and many
other ways unions are drawn into the councils of government and share
directly the power of government.
This allocation of power and control to the union in democratic
countries commonly performs two vital political functions. First, it
creates centers of power and instruments of control apart from the state
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so that the state does not become unmanageable or dangerously large.
Collective bargaining, therefore, shortens the reach of central legal
control by establishing a separate structure of industrial government as
an alternative to suffocating statism. This function was explicit, for
example, in the reestablishment of unions and collective bargaining in
post-war Germany, but it has been no less important in shaping the
roles of unions in other countries. Second, allocation of power to
unions widens and deepens the channels of democratic expression.
Historically, the union movement has been built on the democratic
model. Union officers are chosen by and responsible to the member-
ship; and its policies express the desires of that membership. Unions
are allowed to share governing power at least in part because they pro-
vide a voice through which workers speak. Through collective bargain-
ing, unions carry a measure of democracy into industrial government;
through union representation in government agencies, workers gain a
voice in decisions which touch vital interests. Thus, unions serve as
instruments for distributing power in the ordering of society, and
power is allocated to them with the hope, if not the obligation, that they
provide channels of democratic control.
This, of course, paints the role of the union with a broad brush
which ignores important modifications in each country. The purpose
at this point, however, is to emphasize common basic elements and
not to delineate details. By painting these basic elements in bold relief,
we begin to see the source of our special concern with the relationship
between the union and its members. Unions, though separate from the
state, are an integral part of a total structure for governing society and
are relied upon by the state to perform vital functions in the govern-
ing process. Concern with the relationship between the union and its
members is akin to concern with the relationship between the state and
its citizens. In broader terms, it is the problem of the relationship be-
tween the governing power and the individuals governed. The special
role of unions and their impact on the lives of individual workers set
them apart from almost all other voluntary associations, and justifies, if
not compels, separate study of union processes.
III. THE AREAS OF INQUIRY
This statement of the source of the concern and the nature of the
problem helps suggest the relevant questions to be asked in studying
the relationship between the union and its members. These queries
in turn help direct attention to those comparisons which may prove
most meaningful in understanding relational structures. There are at
least three basic areas of inquiry. First, what is the scope of the union's
control over the individual and how closely is he bound by its de-
cisions? This has been sketched in general terms, but there are signifi-
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cant national differences, and it is important to identify some of the
factors which measure the size and nature of the union's control.
Second, what freedom does the individual have to choose whether to
be subject to the union's control? This includes inquiring as to what
freedom he has to choose between available unions and what freedom
he has to stand outside the system of collective control. Third, what
rights does the individual have within the union's own governmental
processes? Although there are important rights arising out of proceed-
ings before union tribunals and the distribution of benefits to union
members, the central concern here is the right of the member to have
a voice in the decisions of his union. A fourth area of inquiry, though
subordinate to these three, raises special problems such as to what
extent can the union require political conformity of its members or
compel them to contribute to particular political parties or causes?
It is evident that these areas of examination do not stand indepen-
dent of one another, for the relationship between the union and the
individual is a product of the interaction of these basic elements. The
importance of the individual's right to participate in making the de-
cisions of the union varies with the union's power and control; hence,
the need for a fair hearing before a member is expelled is directly re-
lated to the value of continued union membership. To make com-
parisons area by area tends to disjoint the relationship, but it is beyond
the reach of this report to make fully integrated comparisons for the
dozen countries involved. The purpose here is the more modest one of
suggesting a framework of analysis, illuminated by examples from the
various countries, which may help in the study of this relationship
between the union and the individual.
In examining this relationship any inquiry should not be confined
to the formal legal rules, for it is evident that the relationship is largely
a product of private institutions which are less defined by legal rules
than by the informal law of collective bargaining structures and union
rules or practices. Indeed, the fragmentary character of the positive
law reflects the most difficult and fundamental question of the entire
inquiry-to what extent does the state intervene in the affairs of these
private institutions? Here one confronts a tension between two oppos-
ing demands. On the one hand, government cannot allocate control to
private groups and deny responsibility for how that power is exercised.
In a democracy, where concern is not only with the substance of regu-
lation but also with the process through which decisions are made,
government cannot be indifferent to the internal processes of organ-
izations to which governing power has been allocated. On the other
hand, one of the primary purposes of this allocation in a democracy is
to avoid monolithic state control. But this purpose is defeated if the
state so closely supervises unions that they lose all independence and
become little more than administrative arms of the state. How dif-
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ferent countries adjust or reconcile these competing demands may
ultimately provide a most illuminating and instructive comparison,
but this can be seen only as a part of the total relationship of the union
and the individual defined by both private and governmental action.
IV. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF UNION CONTROL
The first basic element of the relationship between the union and
its members is the power and control exercised by the union over the
individual. The extent to which the union regulates the life of the
individual measures one's concern for the rights of the individual in
relation to the union. The scope and nature of the union's control in
each country is significantly different, for it is the product of various
factors which combine in widely varying patterns. The important task
at this point is not to detail the various national patterns, but rather to
identify the principal factors which determine the size and shape of the
union's control. By identifying those factors and recognizing their vari-
ations, the complexity and subtlety of elements affecting the union's
control may emerge. Such specification should also provide a valuable
tool for analyzing the pattern of any particular country and marking
out relevant differences between various countries. The following are
the factors most critical in measuring the union's control over its
members.
A. The Areas of Economic Life Subject to Union Control
In most countries, the primary instrument through which the union
regulates the working life of its members is collective bargaining.
Therefore, the union's control depends in the first instance upon which
terms and conditions of employment are regulated by legislation and
which are left to the private collective process. For example, in France,
collective agreements commonly regulate little more than wage rates,
while hours of work, overtime, holiday and vacation pay, dismissals
and notice of termination are regulated by legislation; in Belgium and
Germany, most of these subjects are left to collective bargaining, al-
though dismissal and notice of termination are controlled by law; and
in Great Britain and the United States, even these latter areas are
governed by bargaining. Thus, in France the union through collective
bargaining has a voice only in determining the individual's wages, but
in the United States the union's control reaches almost every aspect of
his working life, including his right to continue in his employment.
The fact that a particular subject is left to collective bargaining does
not, however, mean that the union exercises any actual control. In
Sweden, for instance, proposals have been made repeatedly for legisla-
tion to regulate dismissals. These proposals have all been rejected on
the grounds that this subject should be regulated by the parties; yet
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collective agreements still contain clauses reserving to the employer
the right to dismiss. Hence, the union exercises at best very limited
control.
The allocation of control over terms and conditions of employment
may be very complex, and the determination of where effective control
rests may be equally difficult. British minimum wage laws are normally
less than the negotiated rates, so effective control is attained through
bargaining. Minimum wages in France, however, have often set the
pattern for negotiated rates so that collective agreements have some-
times been little more than echoes of government control. Statutory
pensions may be the only ones available, as in the case of Swedish non-
salaried workers, but the statutory pensions may be substantially sup-
plemented by negotiated plans, as in the case of many industrial
workers in the United States. Laws regulating hours of work may per-
mit derogation by collective agreement, as in Germany and Sweden,
but there still remains the question of how much the law is in fact
modified by union-employer action. These examples are but illustra-
tive in emphasizing that the union's control over particular subjects
cannot be distilled from the bare words of statutes or collective agree-
ments, but must be measured by close study of the practical workings
of the system.
The union's control through collective bargaining is only partial for
it is shared with the employer, but because the union provides benefits
directly to its members, it often has unilateral control over certain im-
portant rights. For example, British unions pay provident benefits for
unemployment, sickness, accidents, marriage dowry, old age and death.
These supplement the social insurance payments by the state which
provide only bare subsistence. Thus, the individual looks to the union
for adequate protection from the cradle to the grave. Union controlled
supplementary benefits play a lesser but still significant role in coun-
tries as divergent as Chile and Germany; in Brazil, the union's obtain-
ing of legal recognition depends on its providing certain welfare
services for its membership. In many other countries unions provide
few, if any such benefits, leaving these entirely to the state or collective
bargaining. Unions in most countries also provide extensive legal
services to aid members in enforcing a wide range of rights arising out
of the employment relationship, but in the United States many unions
leave solely to the individual all but enforcement of the collective
agreement. The important point here is that, to the extent that the
union provides such benefits, the individual becomes dependent on the
union and its internal processes. If a member is expelled he may lose
his sickness pay; if the union changes its pension program, his old age
is vitally affected; and if it denies him legal services he may in fact be
unable to enforce' his legal rights. The various benefits provided
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directly by the union, added to the various subjects regulated through
collective bargaining, measure for each country the scope of the union's
control over the economic life of the individual.
B. The Tightness of Collective Control
The union's control over terms and conditions of employment
within its sphere of influence depends upon the tightness with which
its collective action binds the individual and limits his freedom in tak-
ing individual action. This is primarily the question of the extent to
which the individual is bound by the collective agreement. In the
United States the individual is wholly subservient to the terms of the
collective agreement-he can bargain for neither better nor worse
terms but must conform to those negotiated by the union. In Sweden
the union member is similarly subject to the collective agreement. At
the other pole, collective agreements in Great Britain establish only a
usage which can be freely varied by individual employment contracts;
the individual would seem to have equal freedom in Chile and Argen-
tina. In between, the collective agreement in most continental coun-
tries can be varied only by individual contracts which are more favor-
able to the employee. This statement of the legal effect of the collective
agreement, however, may obscure the actual freedom exercised by the
member. Thus, while in Great Britain the individual is legally free to
bargain for different terms, in practice, variances are relatively rare;
by comparison, in Germany, the normative terms in the collective
agreement are often significantly lower than those negotiated at the
shop level.
The individual may be further subservient to the union if it controls
the enforcement of individual rights arising out of the collective agree-
ment. For example, in Norway an individual union member cannot
take his case to the labor court. If the union refuses to press his case,
he can do nothing. Thus, his rights under the collective agreement are
wholly controlled by the union. Some state courts in the United States
have similarly given the union complete control over enforcement of
individual rights, but under recent decisions this is now subject to
federal law and these cases are no longer binding. Sweden, as contrasted
with Norway, allows the individual to take his case to the labor court
if the union refuses. In most countries, however, the union exercises
no such domination over enforcement for the employee is considered
to have an individual employment contract which he can enforce on
his own behalf in the labor court or other appropriate tribunal. Again,
the purpose here is not to define the legal effect of the collective agree-
ment, but rather to suggest the varying degrees of authority by which
the union may control the individual's terms of employment and his
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rights under the collective agreement. The greater that authority, the
greater our concern for protecting the individual in relation to the
union.
C. The Strength of the Union
The third and perhaps most important factor in measuring the
union's control over the individual is the union's strength, that is, its
actual ability to make its policies and decisions effective in the labor
market. Even though the collective agreement regulates all significant
terms and is rigidly binding on all employees, the union has no real
power over the individual if it is too weak to do more than ratify terms
dictated by the employer. This is not a matter of law, but of economics.
Thus, while the legal status of the union and the collective agreement
is much the same in Korea and the United States, most unions in Korea
do little more than keep an office, and so have little impact on the
rights of the individual. French unions have far less regulatory power
than German unions because, among other things, they lack the mem-
bership and financial resources to bargain effectively with the em-
ployers' associations.
The strength of the union does not necessarily turn on the per-
centage of the total work force organized, but rather on the relative
strength of the union and the employers with which it bargains. For
example, in the United States the level of unionization is relatively
low, but in the organized sectors unions are often quite strong. In
some industries such as trucking, construction, garment and coal min-
ing, the union can practically dictate terms within the organized sector.
Thus, the union's voice in regulating the individual through the col-
lective agreement may be dominant even though the proportion of the
work force governed is relatively small. The strength of the union also
depends almost as much on the extent of employer organization as on
the extent of union organization. Unions have been dominant in some
industries in the United States only because small employers have
failed to form effective organizations; conversely, unions have been
subordinate in France because they have been confronted with strong
employers' associations. In Belgium, Sweden and to a lesser extent other
continental countries, strong unions have been matched by equally
strong employers' organizations.
There are many other elements which affect the strength of the union
relative to the employer. Those include the effectiveness of economic
weapons such as strikes, boycotts and lockouts; the presence of foreign
or non-union competition; the level of employment; and intangibles
such as the loyalty of members to the union, and the cultural climate
of the community. These elements, combining in different ways from
country to country, determine the ability of the union to influence the
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terms of the collective agreement. They thereby help measure the im-
pact of union decisions on the working life of the individual.
The union's influence in regulating the labor market can be vitally
affected by the role of government in the bargaining process itself.
Legal limitations on economic force directly affect the relative strength
of union and employer, but intervention in the negotiation of the
agreement may more subtly reinforce or negate the union's influence.
Proposals made by government mediators or boards for a settlement
can, thus, exert substantial pressure. The government may be neutral
between the parties and guided by its own policies; whether .its proposal
aids one side or the other is incidental. However, the government may
not be wholly neutral as in Argentina during the Peron regime when
it supported the unions' demands in return for political support. Union
policies and decisions were, thus, reinforced by the government and
gained added influence in fixing terms of the collective agreement. Dur-
ing the Frondizi regime, the government's weight was placed on the
other side and the unions' effectiveness was weakened. Claims that
governments of other countries have at times played a similar though
more restrained and subtle role are not unknown. Whether and to what
extent this is true is not important here, for the point is simply that
the strength of the union to make its decisions effective in the labor
market may be affected by such government intervention.
D. The Availability of Competing Unions
Rival unions may battle each other until they are impotent against
the employer and unable to exert any influence in the labor market.
The availability of a competing union affects the relation between the
union and the individual, however, in another more profound way. If
there is but one union available, the individual must either come
within its control or remain unorganized; if he can not agree with the
union's policy, his only alternative is to stand alone. But if there are
competing unions the individual can choose between them; if he does
not approve of the program or policies of one, he can join another. This
limits the union's control over him and requires it to be more respon-
sive to his wishes and needs.
The extent of competing unionism in various countries covers a
broad spectrum. In South America, the dominant pattern is for the
government to charter or permit but one union for each industry or
enterprise. By contrast, Belgium has two major competing federations
of roughly comparable size, the Socialist Belgian General Confedera-
tion of Labor (FGTB) and the Confederation of Christian Trade
Unions (CSC). In Germany, an industrial worker may now choose be-
tween the Socialist German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) and
the younger Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CBG), while
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salaried and public employees have additional choices of joining the
German Salaried Employees Union (DAG) or special unions of public
employees. French workers have an equally wide range of choice. In
England and the United States, unions are not divided along political
and religious lines as on the continent, nor are there competing federa-
tions. Rival unionism is sharp in some segments of some industries but
almost non-existent in most industries. Particularly in the United States
competition is spotty, non-ideological, and often fratricidal.
The availability of a competing union does not always have the same
significance. In the United States, competing unions may have quite
different collective bargaining policies, but in most European countries
the competing organizations normally cooperate in collective bargain-
ing and end with a common collective agreement. The individual's
choice between unions, therefore, is based on differences in other poli-
cies or activities of the unions, often their benefit programs. In Sweden,
the small Syndicalist organization (SAC), which attempts to compete
with the dominant Confederation of Trade Unions (CLO), has a radi-
cally different bargaining policy, but the employers' associations refuse
to make a collective agreement at variance with one made with the
CLO union. The Syndicalist member is, then, in fact governed by the
CLO agreement whether he chooses or not. However, the Syndicalists'
policies concerning political action, benefit funds, union structure, and
internal union processes are markedly different from those of the CLO
unions and to this extent provide a choice. Even though the policies
of a competing union are not significantly different, or it is too weak
to make its policies effective, its very presence makes the union-member
relation less binding, sensitizes the union to the desires of its members,
and provides an avenue for symbolic protest against union policies.
For this reason the availability of competing unions is an important
factor in measuring the union's control over the individual.
E. The Reliance on Related Institutions
The union's role in regulating the labor market may be reduced
because employees' interests are represented through institutions other
than the union. In Germany, for example, the statutory works councils
(Betriebsrat), which are elected by the employees in the plant and are
no part of the union structure, represent the employees at the plant
level. The works councils negotiate local agreements covering matters
such as piece rates, work schedules, job classifications, and dismissals.
At times, works councils may negotiate the minimum wage rates fixed
by the union's national agreement, supplementary pensions, and sick-
ness benefits. Under such circumstances, the union's control becomes
remote, if not secondary, and inquiry might equally concern itself with
the relation between the works councils and the individual. In France,
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plant level representation is through statutorily created shop stewards'
committees (dlgu6s du personnel) and enterprise committees (comite
d'enterprise), both elected by the employees and organizationally
separate from the union. In sharp contrast, the statutory works councils
in Belgium (dl6gation syndicate) play a very small role and local rep-
resentation is through shop stewards provided for by the collective
agreement and selected by the unions. Swedish unions hold complete
control at the local level through local officers and union directed enter-
prise councils (f6retagsndimnden). In these last two countries, as in the
United States, representation of the employees is solely through the
union with no encroachment by parallel institutions. Thus, the rele-
vant inquiry becomes not the legal status of works councils or the or-
ganizational relation of shop stewards, but rather whether the policies
and decisions at the local level are governed by the union or by some
other institution.
Accurate assessment of this situation of control is often obscured by
formal organizational structures. In electing works councils, for ex-
ample, unions present lists of candidates, either officially as in France,
or unofficially as in Germany. In either case the overwhelming major-
ity of those elected are union candidates, and the union potentially
controls this legally separate body. Union control, however, does not
always become a reality, for those nominated by the union often be-
come quite independent once elected. In Great Britain, shop stewards
are chosen by the union and are organizationally a part of the union,
but here too the formal structure may be deceptive. Steward councils
often refuse to feel bound by union policies and act on their own.
They thereby become, in effect, independent institutions representing
the employees, and tend to reduce rather than extend the impact of
union decisions on the individual.
F. Summary of Factors Measuring Union Control
These are five of the more critical factors used in measuring the
scope and nature of the union's control over the individual. There may
well be others equally important, but identifying these five may at
least suggest the kinds of factors which must be considered if one is
to understand this first basic relationship between the union and the
individual. No attempt has been made to analyze these five factors
in detail, but even from the rough sketch certain significant character-
istics of our problem emerge. First, each major factor itself is composed
of numerous elements which go far beyond legal rules, express agree-
ments, or formal structures. To measure the unions' control one must
see, therefore, the union in the context of the whole collective system.
This requires a deep and extensive probing to determine the role
which the union plays in making the decisions which ultimately govern
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the individual. Second, the making of any general comparisons is
nearly impossible in that the complex elements interact to form unique
patterns which defy simple characterization. After applying the various
factors, one might safely say that French unions have less control over
the individual than have Belgian unions; similarly, one might reason-
ably compare the control of unions in Argentina and Brazil if he knew
the impact of the latest change of governments. But can it be said that
the control exercised by British unions is greater than that exercised
by German unions? Or that unions in Sweden exert less control over
the individual than unions in the United States? And which union in
the United States? This might begin to suggest the limitations and use-
fulness of comparative study in this area. Third, the application of
these factors to the various countries indicates that in every country
which has a substantial trade union movement, unions exercise a sig-
nificant measure of control. Although the patterns vary, unions in all
of these nations hold some form of regulatory power, with members
to some extent dependent on the union for valuable benefits. Thus,
union policies influence the terms of employment and union decisions
vitally affect the members' welfare. This notion, then, leads into two
other significant areas of inquiry: What freedom does the individual
have in determining whether to be subject to the union's control, and
what rights does he have to participate in determining its policies?
V. FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO CHOOSE WHETHER TO BE SUBJECT
TO UNION CONTROL
The individual's freedom to choose whether to be subject to union
control may be curtailed in two distinct ways. First, he may be com-
pelled to become a member of the union and, therefore, subject to
all of its regulations. Second, he may be compelled to follow a collective
agreement even though he is not a member, and to this extent be con-
trolled by the union. The first situation obviously raises the basic
problem of the individual's right of freedom of association, but the
second may be equally or even more important in defining the rela-
tionship between the individual and the union. Both of these point
directly to the fundamental question in this area of inquiry, i.e., to
what extent is the relation with the union voluntary and to what
extent is it compulsory? One cannot, by labeling unions "voluntary
associations," avoid inquiring into this basic question of the ways and
degrees to which the individual is compelled to be subject to the
union's control. The primary purpose of this particular discussion,
then, is to search out and identify the major factors, both legal and
economic, which determine the scope and limitations on the indi-
vidual's freedom of choice.
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A. Freedom of Association
The various national reports make clear that in almost every country
the relation between the union and the individual is rooted deeply in
the concept of freedom of association. This freedom has three broad
thrusts which are important here. First, it is commonly considered to
include the freedom of workers to form unions and, therefore, pro-
vides the supporting base for the right of unions to organize. Second,
it asserts that unions should be free to govern themselves and to define
their relations with their members. One of the direct results of this
broad principle, previously mentioned, is that the state should not
intervene in the internal affairs of unions. Finally, freedom of asso-
ciation logically includes freedom of the individual to decide with
whom he will associate. The primary cause of the problem with which
one is immediately concerned, therefore, is the right of the individual
to choose which, if any, union he will join. Although all countries de-
clare their adherence to freedom of association as a basic right, this
freedom is in no country unlimited. The limitations which must be ex-
amined may be legal, imposed by the state; or they may be economic,
imposed by the union or the employer.
1. Legal Limitations on the Individual's Freedom of Choice as to
Union Membership
Union membership is seldom compelled by law. The only example
reported is in Chile. There, if an industrial union gains the support of
55 per cent of the employees in the establishment, it obtains legal status
as the employees' representative and all of the employees automatically
become union members. In Brazil, the only unions allowed are those
created by the state. Only one union is created for each occupation and
area, and that union is, by law, made the representative of all employees
within its jurisdiction. Membership is not compelled, but each em-
ployee is required to contribute to the union an amount fixed by
law and deducted from his wages. To become a member, he must make
an additional payment. Although this is in form a lesser compulsion
than that in Chile, it is in fact greater. While in Chile, an individual
is required to become a member only if the union has won the vol-
untary adherence of the majority, the individual in Brazil is compelled
to support a union which rests on no voluntary adherence by the work-
ers. It would seem, however, that in both countries compulsory mem-
bership imposes no burden other than payment of union dues.
Even though the law does not compel membership or financial sup-
port, it may limit the individual's freedom of choice by permitting
only a single union. In Argentina the law states that "workers are en-
titled to form unions freely," but the only union allowed to represent
the employees trade interests, engage in collective bargaining, or par-
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ticipate in government agencies is the one designated by the state as
"most representative." The individual has no practical choice but to
join that one or none at all. In the words of the Argentine reporter, "the
freedom to organize as set forth by the law, if not nonexistent, is in any
case relative." Any law which conditions the union's functioning on its
meeting certain legal requirements may, if a union is thereby barred,
narrow the individual's freedom of choice. For example, in the United
States a union proven to be Communist controlled can be, in effect,
legally dissolved. An order has now been issued but is being appealed
applying this law to a substantial union. If the order is enforced, the
employees now represented by this union will be denied their first
choice of unions, and employees in other plants where this union at-
tempts to organize will have less choice-indeed, these employees may
be left with no choice at all.
2. Economic Limitations on the Individual's Freedom of Choice
as to Union Membership
Far more important than legal compulsions to join or support a
union are economic pressures which may make union membership, in
effect, mandatory. The most direct and effective economic device is the
union security or organization clause in the collective agreement. These
clauses may take many forms, viz., requiring membership to obtain a
job, giving preference in jobs to union members, requiring member-
ship within a limited time after obtaining a job, or requiring all em-
ployees to give financial support to the union, and other variations. But
all have the common element of making an individual's employment
dependent in one fashion or another on his union status. The law in
the various reporting countries has responded to such use of economic
pressure in four different ways, each having a significantly different
impact on the individual's freedom.
First, the individual may be compelled to become and remain a
member of the particular union. Thus in Great Britain, unions may
freely bargain for the closed shop or strike at any time to compel the
discharge of employees who are not in good standing in the union.
The same seems to be the case in Peru. The impact on the individual
in these instances is multiple and severe. He can be deprived of any
freedom either to choose between unions or to remain unorganized;
but more important, if he violates any union rule and loses his good
standing, the union can cause him to be discharged. He is compelled
not only to join the union and support it financially, but also to obey
all of its laws and abide by its decisions. Expulsion thus deprives him
both of his rights within the union and his right to his job.
Second, the individual may be compelled to join some union but not
any particular union. For example, Swedish law protects the "positive"
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right of association-the right to join and support the union of one's
choice; but it does not protect the "negative" right of association-the
right to remain unorganized. The union cannot cause the discharge
of one who belongs to another union but only one who belongs to no
union. Here the impact on the individual is significantly less than in
the first situation for he is completely free to choose between unions.
Nor can he be compelled to obey union rules, for if he is threatened
with expulsion by one union he may be able to quickly join a com-
peting union and obtain immunity.
Third, while not required to become a member, the individual may
be compelled to contribute financial support to a particular union.
An illustration of this can be found in the United States, where under
the Taft-Hartley Act, the majority union as statutory bargaining agent
may negotiate an agreement requiring all employees it represents to
tender regular dues and initiation fees thirty days after becoming em-
ployed. The individual is not required to take an oath of loyalty to
the union, attend union meetings or obey any union rules; and if he
is expelled, he loses his membership rights but not his job. The effect
on the individual is, then, solely to his pocketbook for he is still re-
quired to contribute financial support. Under the U.S. Railway Labor
Act, the individual enjoys greater freedom since he can comply with
one union's organization clause by maintaining his membership in a
competing union which represents his craft or class.
Fourth, the individual may be guaranteed the right to join any or no
union as he chooses. For example, in Germany, the Constitution (Art.
9, par. 3) expressly prohibits as a violation of freedom of association
the use of economic pressure to compel a person to join a particular
union, and, according to the German Report, it is generally agreed that
this and other constitutional protections also cover the freedom not to
join any union. Similarly, in France, Switzerland, and Korea the in-
dividual's full freedom of association is protected either by constitu-
tion or statute.
These four broad categories emphasize the different ways in which
the employee's freedom may be limited. Such general statements of
the legal rules, however, gloss over many details, and those details may
significantly change the effect of the law. For instance, in Sweden, the
law protects only those already employed and not those seeking em-
ployment. Therefore, agreements requiring the employer to hire only
members of the particular union are completely valid and enforceable
in the labor court. Members of a competing union are thus protected
only so long as they remain employed. Once they are laid off they may
be barred from new employment. This is important, for closed shop
clauses are most prevalent in industries such as construction where
employment is typically short term. The legal protection, therefore,
gives little actual protection. While Belgium prohibits making employ-
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ment depend upon membership in a particular union for the purpose
of maliciously interfering with freedom of association, this does not
prevent a union from adopting and enforcing a rule that members
will work only with trade unionists. This qualification was held not
to be a malicious interference with freedom of association, but a pro-
tection of a legitimate occupational interest. These examples serve to
remind us to distrust generalities in this area, and further emphasize
the need to examine the legal rules with greatest care to determine the
extent to which they protect the individual's freedom of choice from
economic pressure.
This inquiry, however, must press beyond the legal rules to the
critical question of the extent to which workers are, in fact, compelled
to become members. In Sweden, the law does not protect the individual
who wishes to remain unorganized, although the dominant employers'
associations have barred all contractual provisions making employment
dependent on union status. There, organization or security clauses
occur only in contracts with employers who do not belong to these
associations. As a result, such clauses are relatively rare, covering at
most ten per cent of all those governed by collective agreements. In
England, where no legal limits exist on economic pressure to compel
membership, it has been estimated that less than one-fifth of all work-
ers are directly affected by the closed shop. The United States statistics,
in spite of laws in nearly half of the states prohibiting all forms of
union security, show that nearly 75 per cent of all employees covered by
collective agreements are required to contribute to the union. This
figure, however, must in turn be seen in the context of the compara-
tively small proportion of the work force covered by collective agree-
ments in the United States. In looking beyond the legal rules one
should not assume that the law is scrupulously obeyed or enforced, for
at least in the United States and perhaps in other countries, unions
and employers have at times found such legal commands less impera-
tive than their economic convenience or institutional needs. Nor can
one look only to written provisions in collective agreements, since it
is clear that informal measures may be equally effective in enforcing
closed shop conditions. These are but suggestive of the many elements
which must be examined in each country if one is to determine the
extent to which union membership is in fact voluntary or compulsory.
Economic pressure to join the union may come in a less direct and
compelling form through the union's benefit program where those
benefits are payable only to union members. Thus, if the union pro-
vides benefits such as sickness insurance, pensions or widow's allow-
ances, and the individual worker cannot practically obtain equivalent
protection elsewhere, he must join the union to provide for these
needs. More important, he must continue in good standing or forfeit
his benefits. These benefits can, therefore, provide the pivot for press-
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ing him to conform to all union rules. In some countries this has
proven to be a lesser though adequate substitute for the union security
agreement.
Finally, an individual may have no practical freedom to choose be-
tween unions simply because there is only one union available. He
must either join that union or remain unorganized, a less than wholly
satisfactory alternative. In a number of countries the unions have
sought to achieve this result. The Swedish Confederation of Trade
Unions permits no choice between member national unions, and has all
but eliminated competition with the Central Organization of Salaried
Employees (TCO). The only alternative is the Syndicalists with whom
the employers' associations refuse to deal. In England, the Bridlington
Agreement has sought to curb competition between unions belonging
to the Trades Union Congress (TUC); and in the United States the No-
Raiding Pact has sought the same objective within the AFL-CIO. The
point here is not whether these devices are good or bad, but rather that
the effect is to narrow the individual's freedom of choice as to union
membership. The presence or absence of competing unions is simply
another factor to be considered in determining the extent to which
membership in a particular union is voluntary or compulsory.
B. Union Control Over Non-Members
Even though the individual can and does refuse to become a mem-
ber of the union, he may not thereby escape the union's collective con-
trol, for he may be compelled to follow the union's collective agree-
ment. In every reporting country, the collective agreement is applied
in some fashion and degree to non-union employees. The outward
reach of the collective agreement may take four general forms, each
of which curtails the individual's freedom to choose whether to be
subject to union control.
1. Exclusive Legal Representative
In the United States, the union designated by the majority of em-
ployees in a bargaining unit becomes the exclusive representative of
all employees. The employer can negotiate with no other union and its
collective agreement becomes binding on all employees regardless of
union membership. Whether the individual chooses another union
or remains non-union, he is represented and bound by the majority
union. The union's relation to the individual is clearly compulsory,
though certain tempering elements should be considered. The union
must be the voluntary choice of a majority of the employees and that
majority is officially determined by secret ballot. The election district
or bargaining unit is relatively small, normally a single plant or even a
single craft or department within a plant, and seldom larger than the
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plants of a single employer. Employees can also continue their mem-
bership in the minority union although it cannot represent them, and
they can demand another election when the collective agreement termi-
nates or within three years of an election. Thus, the individual's free-
dom is suspended for a limited period by majority rule exercised in
relatively small units. The exclusive representation principle also oper-
ates in South America, but at least in Argentina and Brazil it takes quite
a different form, as previously noted. In Argentina, the union desig-
nated "most representative" by the government becomes the sole union
and its contracts bind all employees regardless of membership. The
union need not be the voluntary choice of a majority, nor can the em-
ployees by their vote unseat it. In Brazil, the unions are entirely a cre-
ation of the state. Each union is made the legal representative for all
employees in its occupational group and binds them by its collective
agreements. Yet, only ten to fifteen per cent of the workers are members.
2. Extension by Legal Order
In most European countries a collective agreement made with a
number of employers or an employers' association can be "extended"
by government order to apply to outside employers and their employees,
and non-union employees of employers initially and voluntarily covered
by a collective agreement. For example, in Germany, the collective
agreement itself establishes compulsory terms only for union members
employed by contracting employers, but if the Minister of Labor finds
that extension is in the public interest, the collective agreement consti-
tutes a "common rule" and all employees of all employers in the trade
or industry are governed by the agreement. In France, as in the United
States, the contracting employer is bound by statute to apply the col-
lective agreement to all of his employees regardless of union member-
ship. By extending the contract, however, the Minister of Labor brings
employees of other employers within the union's collective control. Ex-
tension does not rest on a voluntary choice of the employees. In France,
the collective agreement must have been made by "the most repre-
sentative organizations," but this does not mean that a majority of the
employees, even of the contracting employers, are union members. In-
deed, in most instances only a small minority even purport to be union
members. In Germany, employers who have been parties to the agree-
ment must employ at least one-half of their non-union employees within
its extended scope, but there is no requirement that the agreement ini-
tially be made with a majority union, though this is probably the
normal case. The same is true in Switzerland, but with the added re-
quirement that minorities, especially regional minorities, must be
protected.
There is no need to delineate the detailed rules or procedures for
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extension of collective agreements in various countries. All have in
common two basic characteristics which are important. First, extension
has the effect of making the collective agreement applicable to indi-
viduals who are not members of the union, and in that respect subjects
them to the union's control. Second, the union's control is not always
based on majority rule of the employees involved, for extension can
be and often is ordered when less than half of the employees affected
are union members. The intrinsic character of extension ought not
be viewed apart from extrinsic facts which measure its practical impact.
Extension is apparently the exception in Germany but almost the rule
in France, while the English version under the Terms and Conditions
of Employment Act of 1959 seems to have little practical effect. In some
countries such as Belgium and Switzerland, the negotiating unions ac-
tually have a clear majority, but in other countries such as France the
union has a small minority. Finally, extension may place no practical
bonds on the individual where the terms of the collective agreement
carry little legal weight, and where the individual's ability to bargain
for better terms is substantial.
3. Extension by Collective Agreement
Sweden has no statutory provision for extension of collective agree-
ments; in legal theory, the agreement binds only union members. How-
ever, the collective agreement may require the employer to apply the
same or equal terms to non-union employees. This provision is legally
enforceable in the Labor Court. Indeed, the requirement is considered
so natural and essential that it will be read into the agreement by the
Labor Court in the absence of an explicit clause to the contrary. While
non-union individuals or competing unions can also theoretically
bargain for different terms, agreement by the employer exposes him
to legal sanctions-if he agrees to some term less than that in the
collective agreement he will be liable for breach of contract; if he
agrees to some term better, he may be liable for breach of contract and
also provide evidence of a violation of freedom of association. The end
result is that the employer cannot safely deviate from the terms of the
agreement with the dominant union. The practical impact is much like
the American exclusive representation rule whereby non-union employ-
ees are governed by the collective agreement regardless of their choice.
In Sweden, although the majority of the employees of a particular em-
ployer may not be union members, the employer and his workers may
still be bound by the collective contract because the number of em-
ployees of all the employers in the employers' association comprises an
overwhelming majority. One significant difference is that the Swedish
union clearly has no control over claims arising under the individual's
contract of employment since the individual obtains no legal rights
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through the collective agreement. By contrast, in the United States the
individual's rights are rooted in the collective contract, and the con-
tract commonly provides that the union alone has control over all
rights claimed through it. This provides the basis for the argument,
which is likely contrary to section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, that in
the United States the union can surrender, compromise, or refuse to
enforce individual rights under the collective agreement.
4. Extension by Pressures for Standardization
Within a single enterprise there are strong pressures for standardiza-
tion of terms and conditions of employment between employees per-
forming similar work. The larger the enterprise the greater these pres-
sures become. Between various employers, particularly where there
develops an employers' association, there are sometimes other less com-
pelling but still weighty pressures for equalization of employment
terms. In England, the non-union employee has full freedom to bar-
gain individually, but the terms negotiated by the union either nation-
ally or locally establish a standard from which he can only in rare in-
stances deviate. Practically, even though not legally, the collective
agreement becomes a "common rule" by which the individual is gov-
erned. There is no need here to explore the many ways and extent to
which such pressures may operate; it is enough to call attention to the
fact that regardless of the legal rules, these economic and institutional
forces may give the union effective power to compel the individual to
conform to the union's collective agreement. If we are to see the full
extent to which an individual is subject to the union's control, we
must include these forces in the scope of our inquiry.
Apart from the collective agreement, the union may extend its influ-
ences or control over individuals outside the union through many other
channels. For example, in France the shop stewards (d@16gu~s du per-
sonnel) and works councils (comite d'enterprise) are elected from lists
submitted by the "representative" unions. These bodies which repre-
sent all of the workers at the local level on a wide range of important
matters are made up of union militants nominated by the union. Sitting
on government bodies which administer social insurance legislation are
elected representatives of insured persons selected from lists submitted
by the chief trade unions. In Germany, unions do not participate offi-
cially in works councils but they generally submit lists of candidates
which are almost always elected. To the extent that the unions thereby
control the policies of the works councils, they become in effect the
exclusive representatives of all of the employees at the shop level.
Through these and many other institutions, unions are recognized as
the spokesmen and guardians of the interests of all employees, thereby
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subjecting individuals who are not members of a union to the union's
policies and decisions.
C. Summary
The fact that the law in almost every country classifies unions as
"voluntary associations," and considers the relationship between the
union and the individual to be rooted in the basic right of freedom of
association, is doubly deceptive. It is deceptive first, because it gives an
appearance of common values and common legal principles which con-
ceals a wide range of differences. The terms "voluntary association" and
"freedom of association" do not always describe identical concepts.
Even though they may have a common core, they often differ in those
very details which are most significant in our study of the relation
between the union and the individual. The use of these terms is decep-
tive secondly, because the relationship between the union and the indi-
vidual is seldom wholly voluntary and the individual's freedom of asso-
ciation is often less than complete.
Unions are voluntary in most countries in the sense that the law
itself neither commands the individual to become a member nor pro-
hibits him from becoming a member. The national reports make plain,
however, basic differences as to whether economic force can be used
to deprive the individual of his freedom of association. In a number
of countries the individual, under pain of losing his livelihood, may
be compelled to join or support a union. Although the form of the
pressure applied and the measure of allegiance required varies, the
relationship to that degree ceases to be voluntary. But union security
or organization clauses are not the main instrument of union control
over the individual. The main instrument is the collective agreement
and other institutions through which the union helps regulate terms
and conditions of employment. In almost every country, the union's
sphere of influence does not end at the boundaries of its membership
but, in fact, extends to those who may belong to other unions or who
are unorganized. Whether this is achieved by formal legal devices such
as exclusive representation by a majority union or extension of collec-
tive agreements, or whether it is achieved by less formal devices of
establishing patterns which are in practice imposed on others, the con-
sequence is clear-the individual is, realistically speaking, subject to the
union's control regardless of his choice.
VI. THE RIGHTS OF THE MEMBER WITHIN THE UNION
In the preceding sections the identification of the principal factors
which measure the scope and nature of the union's control over the
individual and the degree of his freedom to choose whether to be sub-
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ject to the union's control has been sought. One comes now to the most
important and also the most difficult area of inquiry: What rights does
the individual have within this collective body which acts as his repre-
sentative and provides his benefits? The importance of those rights, like
the reasons for one's entire inquiry into the relationship between the
union and the individual, is rooted in the special purpose which unions
serve in a democratic society. Proceeding from the premise that one of
the vital functions of unions is to widen and deepen the democratic
process, the inquiry should be focused on those rights which are central
to fulfilling that function.
The rights with which one is primarily concerned can be roughly
grouped under four headings: (1) The right to become and remain a
member of the union; (2) The right to participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the decisions of the union; (3) The right to fair procedures
in union tribunals; and (4) The right to have union funds used for
proper purposes. These are not so much rights which the individual
has against the union, as rights which he has within the union. In meas-
uring these rights the critical question is the extent to which they are,
in fact, recognized in the union's governmental process. This recogni-
tion may be far less a product of legal rules than of union practices,
and the individual must often seek vindication of his rights under the
union's own law administered by its own tribunals. These rights are
thus defined and protected by two bodies of law-the public law of the
state and the private law of the union. This poses the basic question of
the relation between these two bodies of law, that is, the extent to
which the state will intervene to apply its law in the union's internal
process. This fundamental question of the relative role of the state and
the union in defining and protecting the individual's rights is prelimi-
nary to any meaningful discussion of the scope of those rights.
A. The Role of the Law in Defining and Protecting the Rights of
Members
Legal theory in both civil law and common law countries has tradi-
tionally characterized the relationship between the member and his
union as one of contract. The union's constitution and by-laws are
considered a contract of association, and the individual by joining the
union agrees to be bound by the terms of that contract. This contract
theory, however, has been sharply criticized as artificial and inadequate.
If the union is not a legal entity, critics reason, then the contract must
be with each of the thousands of other members, most of them unknow-
ing and unknown. Neither party to the contract has any choice as to
its terms since those terms are prescribed by the constitution and by-
laws. It is an inflexible contract of adhesion, but at the same time lacks
any stability for it is constantly subject to change through the union's
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process of amendment. The member is deemed to agree not only to
the expressed rules but also to the future decisions of unnamed union
officers and tribunals acting under rules yet conceived. Opponents thus
contend that this fiction strains even the elastic concepts of contract.
The significant function of the contract theory, however, is not to de-
scribe the relationship between the union and its members, but rather
to explain the relationship between the law and the union's internal
rules-the relationship between the public law of the state and the pri-
vate law of the union. Contract theory can thus be employed to ration-
alize the role of the law in defining and protecting the rights of mem-
bers within the union. In rationalizing that role, the theory implicitly
asserts three basic principles which provide a useful framework for
analysis and comparison.
First, the contract theory asserts that the law should properly concern
itself with the relationshp between the union and its members. By
characterizing rights within unions as contract rights, it declares that
those rights are worthy of legal protection, that the union's processes
may not always be adequate to protect or enforce them, and that when
such deficient protection occurs the law should intervene. The contract
theory thus denies that the union is wholly autonomous in administer-
ing its internal affairs. The Hungarian Report makes this clear by con-
trast. There it is stated that union by-laws have no legal significance
and that no legal sanctions are available either to the union or to the
members to enforce rights against one another. Resort is solely to the
internal organs of the union which are vested with "self-administra-
tion" as an attribute of autonomy. The same view is reflected less
explicitly in the Yugoslav Report. These two reports, however, are the
only national reports which proceed from the premise that the law has
no role in enforcing rights within the union. The French and Belgian
Reports, which criticize the contract theory and urge the institutional
theory, do not reject the basic principle that the law should concern
itself with the relationship between the union and its members.
Although the law has a place in enforcing rights within the union,
union self-administration of those rights may also have a significant
role. The important question thus becomes one of the interrelation
of the legal process and the union process, and here the law in the
various countries shows marked differences. In the United States, the
courts developed the doctrine that the law should not intervene until
available appeals within the union had been exhausted. Although this
doctrine was subject to various exceptions and often circumvented by
the courts themselves, it expressed the principle that enforcement of
rights within the union should be first through the union's processes
and only as a last resort through the legal processes. Although recent
legislation has endorsed this principle, it has tended to crystallize the
rule by limiting the time in which a member can pursue his internal
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remedies. In England, however, this doctrine of deference to union self-
government has little if any vitality; and in Sweden, it has been expli-
citly rejected. The role of union self-administration may be further
reflected in the weight given by courts to decisions of union tribunals.
Here again are marked differences. For example, in expulsion cases,
the union's findings of fact are apparently conclusive on the courts in
Belgium and France; the findings will be followed unless clearly erro-
neous in England, are generally given only limited weight in the
United States, and are replaced by the court's own evaluation of the
evidence in Sweden. In various other ways the legal process may show
different degrees of deference to union process. These examples but
suggest the kind of inquiry required to analyze or compare even at the
theoretical level the relative role of the legal and union processes in
enforcing rights within the union.
In practical terms it must further be recognized that although the
law stands ready to intervene, its help may seldom be sought. Thus,
the legal remedies may be inadequate, legal enforcement may cost more
than the rights are worth, the members may be unaware of their legal
rights, or, as is suggested in several of the national reports, members
may be extremely reluctant to carry their internal union disputes to
outside tribunals. These elements, too, vary from country to country
and any meaningful perspective of the role of the law must include
this factual dimension.
The second basic principle asserted by the contract theory is that the
rights to be enforced are those prescribed by the union itself. The
union, by adopting its constitution or rules, writes its own body of sub-
stantive law governing its internal affairs. The function of the court
is to enforce the union's substantive law. The contract theory thus
expresses the fundamental value of union self-government. It is for the
union to design its own structure of government, select procedures for
making decisions, and define the rights of its membership. The role of
the law is to require that the union's self-determined procedures and
rules be followed.
Enforcing the union's substantive law, however, is not always a
mechanical function. Union constitutions are typically general and
many provisions are vague or ambiguous. Before enforcing the con-
tract the court must interpret it, choosing between possible meanings.
In both the United States and England where there have been enough
cases to discern a pattern, the courts have not only refused to be bound
by the union's interpretation but have often read their own views as
to proper conduct and procedure into the union's rules. The French
Report cites a recent case in which the court read into the constitution
the right of a majority of a union to change its affiliation to another
confederation. Thus, by this interpretive function, the courts assume
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a supplementary but significant role in defining the rights of union
members.
The contract theory encompasses a third basic principle-that the
law places limits on the union's freedom to write its own rules. Con-
tract theory incorporates the general principle that provisions in a con-
tract may be declared illegal or ineffective because they violate legal
rules or contravene social policy. For example, in the United States,
union rules prohibiting members from suing to enforce their rights in
the union, from testifying before legislative committees, or from cri-
ticizing union officers, have been declared "contrary to public policy"
and, therefore, void. In England, union trial procedures which do not
provide the accused with adequate notice of the charges, opportunity
to be heard, and an unbiased tribunal, are deemed violative of "natu-
ral justice" and invalid. And in Peru, union rules cannot impose obli-
gations which constitute an "abuse of rights." Statutory provisions may
similarly invalidate or supersede union-made rules. Thus, the con-
tract theory is used to make union rules subordinate to legal rules and
policies.
It is self-evident that the contract theory does not prescribe the role
of the law in defining and enforcing rights within the union, but that
it only offers a rationalization for that part which the law does play.
However, it does serve to emphasize that both legal and union institu-
tions have concurrent roles. The union has the primary role in defin-
ing substantive rights, but these may also be shaped by the law through
interpretation or supplanted by overriding social policies. While the
law is available to help enforce these rights, it does not preclude en-
forcement through the union's own processes. The contract theory also
helps us focus on those questions which measure the relative role of
the legal and union institutions; in the process the degree of autonomy
enjoyed by the union may thereby be gauged. How freely do the courts
use their power to interpret union rules? To what extent are union
rules circumscribed or supplanted by legal rules? How much deference
is given to decisions of union tribunals? Is legal protection used only
as a last resort after union processes have failed? These critical ques-
tions the contract theory poses but cannot satisfactorily answer. At
best it can but rationalize such diverse systems as the closely controlled
state-created unions of Brazil and the nearly wholly autonomous unions
of Belgium. These significant questions, then can be answered only by
detailed study of the actual operation of the law in each country.
One critical factor in measuring the role of the law remains. The
impact on union self-government may be radically different depending
on the kinds of rights which the law seeks to establish and protect. If
the law fixes union dues, limits the purposes for which union funds
can be used, requires the union to provide certain social benefits, or
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determines the suitability of union officers, it thereby transfers the mak-
ing of these decisions from the union members to the state. Legal defi-
nition of such rights impoverishes union self-government. This seems
to be the pattern of regulation in South American countries such as
Argentina and Brazil.
The recent LMRDA in the United States has quite a different thrust,
however, for its dominant premise is that union members should gov-
ern their own affairs. The law is directed primarily toward protecting
the democratic process within the union, leaving free the decisions to
be made through that process. The right of members to criticize union
policy is protected, but the choice of policy is left to union processes;
elections are closely regulated, but the members decide who shall be
the officers; union funds must be used only for union purposes, but
the law does not prescribe those purposes. The union is left free to
design its own structure of government with the one limitation that
it must meet minimum standards of democratic rights. The underlying
assumption is that if union decisions are the product of a democratic
process they thereby acquire added validity, and that union self-gov-
ernment has added claim when it is democratic government. Thus, pro-
tection of basic democratic rights reduces the need and justification for
legal control over union decisions, and the role of the law is self-limit-
ing. In this fashion, the LMRDA seeks to meet the responsibility of gov-
ernment for how the power allocated to unions is exercised, and at
the same time attempts to preserve the independence of unions as
instruments for the distribution of power and to keep their decisions
free from state control. The Act endeavors to, thus, resolve the self-
government problem by requiring of unions no more than adherence
to democratic structures and principles which they themselves have
historically avowed.
B. The Right to Membership
The threshold right of an individual within the union is his right
to become and remain a member. Denial of membership may deprive
him of three valuable interests. First, it may interfere with his employ-
ment if the collective agreement has a union security provision or the
union enforces such a requirement. The severity of this injury depends
upon the nature of the union security arrangement and its pervasive-
ness in the area and industry; in special circumstances, it may effectively
bar a person from working at his trade. Second, exclusion from the
union may deprive the individual of various social benefits provided
by the organization. The importance of this depends on the particular
benefits offered and their practical availability elsewhere. For example,
pensions or medical insurance may be difficult to obtain through other
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channels, and strike benefits are provided only by the union. A mem-
ber who is expelled may, furthermore, be unable to replace life insur-
ance cancelled by his expulsion. Denial of membership, thirdly, bars the
individual from any participation in the union's decisions which affect
his welfare. Thus, he cannot speak at union meetings; he cannot vote
in union referenda; and he cannot be a candidate for union office.
Where the union exercises substantial control, the individual's right
to participate may be considered the most important interest involved,
especially where power has been allocated to the union for the purpose
of strengthening the democratic process.
1. Admission
The national reports show that in every country union membership
is generally open to all occupied within the jurisdiction of the union.
Even where unions are organized along religious or political lines, as
in most continental countries, all who seek to join are freely admitted
without any inquiry into their political views or party affiliation.
Exceptions to the general rule of open membership exists, however,
and they are best known in the United States. There, a substantial num-
ber of unions have constitutional provisions barring "Communists,"
"Nazis," "Fascists" or other "subversives," but these are seldom used
to deny admission. More notorious are the small number of unions
which by formal rule or informal practice enforce racial bars.
When confronted with denial of admission, the law has protected the
individual's right to work. Courts in the United States have consist-
tently ruled that a union security agreement cannot be enforced against
persons arbitrarily excluded. This result is now incorporated in the
Taft-Hartley Act. A Brazilian court intervened when a union refused
admission of new members in order to retain a monopoly over jobs;
and in Sweden, a man excluded because it was believed he had cooper-
ated with the Nazis in Norway, was ordered admitted when the court
found that he was dependent on membership for obtaining employ-
ment. The law has not given such consistent protection, however, to
the individual's right to participate. Thus, courts in the United States
have refused to order unions to admit Negroes even though the union
was by statute the exclusive bargaining representative. Recent United
States legislation, while protecting democratic rights within the union,
does not protect the right to join. In sharp contrast, Swiss law gives
this interest in union membership explicit recognition. There, the fed-
eral statute requires that a collective agreement cannot be extended
to non-members unless they are able to join the union. The individual's
right to participate is, thus, tied directly to the union's statutory power
to represent him in collective bargaining.
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2. Expulsion
In every country the union is considered to have inherent power to
discipline members who violate union rules. The principal sanction
is to deprive the individual of some or all of his membership rights.
Expulsion, the most common penalty, totally destroys all of the valu-
able interests in membership; fines condition those interests on a pay-
ment of money; and suspension or barring from union meetings may
curtail the right to participate in union government. In analyzing these
various forms of union discipline, two significant elements must be
examined-the offenses which are punished, and the procedure through
which guilt is determined and the penalty imposed. The national re-
ports suggest that union rules and procedures in the various countries
bear striking similarity on several crucial points.
Union rules customarily name a wide range of offenses for which
members may be disciplined. More important, these rules almost al-
ways include blanket or catch-all clauses which can be used to punish
almost any conduct. For example, members may be expelled for
"trouble making" in Brazil, "notorious misconduct" in Belgium,
"unedifying behavior" in France, "action unworthy of a member" in
Hungary, and "jeopardizing the honor or interests of the union" in
Switzerland. Such provisions typically give no adequate guide or warn-
ing to the members as to what conduct is prohibited. The more critical
danger, however, is that these blanket clauses may be used to punish
members for exercising basic rights or as a means to curb the demo-
cratic process within the union. For example, in England, a member
who brought suit in the courts to prevent the union from using its
funds to support the Labor Party was expelled for "conduct detrimen-
tal to the union"; in Sweden, a member who in a union debate opposed
the adoption of a resolution barring Communists from union office was
expelled for "acting disloyally"; and in the United States, members
who distributed a leaflet criticizing the incumbent officers during a
union election campaign were disciplined for "conduct in violation of
their obligation as union members." The way union disciplinary
clauses are applied is largely unknown, and these cases emphasize the
importance of making critical factual inquiry which goes beyond the
union rules to discover the conduct actually punished. The central
focus of this inquiry should be on the extent to which discipline is
used to curb the member's basic rights.
Disciplinary procedures commonly begin at the local level and pro-
gress upward through the union hierarchy with final appeal to the
union's national convention. A hearing may be held before the local
membership or executive committee with a right of appeal to the offi-
cers of the central organization as in England, France, and the United
States; or the local officers, after investigation, may make recommenda-
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tions to the national officers who then give the accused the opportunity
to explain his position, as in Germany, Hungary, and Sweden. These
procedures commonly manifest two important characteristics. First,
they are customarily informal, conducted without lawyers, and reflect
the layman's view of what is adequate to determine guilt or innocence.
As a result they often ignore safeguards which the law considers crucial.
Second, the tribunals are normally the regular political or adminis-
trative bodies of the union, i.e., the local meeting, the officers or execu-
tive committees, and the union convention or congress. Neither trial nor
appeal is to a separate and independent judicial body. The decisions,
therefore, may be influenced by political considerations. A number of
national reports have emphasized the inadequacy of disciplinary proce-
dures. The Swiss Report states that the original procedure "is too sum-
mary and often neglected," and the Belgian Report states that the pro-
cedures are "systematic and may give rise to abuses." There is obvious
room for critical study of the extent to which union disciplinary pro-
cedure in each country meets the standards generally considered by
that country to be appropriate for adjudicating other interests com-
parable to those involved in union membership.
Legal limitations on union discipline vary widely even though com-
monly expressed in terms of the contract theory. The courts in some
countries scrutinize the discipline closely to discover defects. In Eng-
land for example, the tool of judicial interpretation is used to protect
the individual. There, unambiguous union rules are strictly construed,
ambiguous rules are construed against the union, and blanket clauses
are limited by the court to protect the member from harsh or arbitrary
treatment. Procedural flaws in the United States are often found by
the courts to justify the invalidation of the discipline, while in Sweden,
the judiciary seems to ignore altogether the union's procedure and re-
judge the merits of the case directly. On the other hand, in Belgium and
Switzerland, the courts apparently do not scrutinize the discipline so
closely; this has resulted in a situation of far less protection for the
member.
Explicit limitations on punishable offenses have been most fully
developed in the United States. Among the many prerogatives expressly
protected by the LMRDA are the right of free speech and assembly
within the union; the right to nominate, vote for, and support candi-
dates for union office; and the right to sue the union. Any discipline of
a member for exercising these rights is unlawful. Even prior to the
statute, however, the courts had used the contract theory to give sub-
stantial protection to these rights. While some tendency to protect such
rights might be found in the English and Swedish cases, legal limita-
tions on offenses seem wholly undeveloped in the other reported
countries.
By contrast, several national reports indicate that the law does re-
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quire that disciplinary procedures provide the accused a fair hearing.
It is not at all clear, however, what each country considers essential for
a fair hearing, and the standards may be markedly different. In Eng-
land, the accused must be given adequate notice of the charges, oppor-
tunity to hear witnesses and cross-examine them, and opportunity to
present his evidence; also the hearing must be before an unbiased
tribunal. Under the German system, an oral proceeding need not be
held, and the accused's right may be little more than an opportunity
to present a written answer to the charges. Such comparisons are, of
course, worth little unless seen in the context of legal procedures which
are considered acceptable in the corresponding countries. Thus, when
the union adjudicates the right to membership, the major considera-
tion again becomes whether the law in a particular country requires
union procedures to meet standards of fairness considered essential in
legal procedures for adjudicating comparable individual rights.
3. Resignation
When a member seeks to withdraw from his union, it raises prob-
lems totally different from those raised when he seeks to become or
remain a member. Withdrawal may free him from two obligations:
first, the duty to support the union financially; and second, his duties
under a future collective agreement to which he would be personally
bound because of his membership. The right to resign is generally
recognized both by union practice and legal principles, but this right
is not always absolute. In Germany, while the right to resign is con-
sidered a part of freedom of association, a requirement demanding
a three or six months notice of intent to withdraw is generally con-
sidered legal. Similarly, a Swiss statute provides that the maximum
notice which can be required is six months prior to the end of the year.
In Sweden it is further argued that the union can prevent withdrawal
even after reasonable notice where withdrawal is motivated by a desire
to escape financial obligations, particularly during a labor dispute. In
none of these countries, however, does there seem to have been explicit
discussion as to whether an individual who has disavowed the union
can be bound by a subsequent collective agreement.
C. The Right to Participate
One of the individual's most significant rights within the union is
his right to participate in the decisions made by the union, decisions
which vitally affect his welfare. This participation may be direct,
through referenda, or it may be indirect through the election of officers
and representatives. The central question concerns the extent to which
the member, along with his fellow members, is able to make his voice
heard and have his wishes weighed in the union's decision-making
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process. This inquiry, though simple to state, is as difficult as it is im-
portant. Study of formal union structures is inadequate, if not mis-
leading, for the formal structure is but an outer shell. Inquiry must
go to the inner political life of the union, the interacting forces and
complex processes through which decisions are, in fact, made. Such a
probe is far beyond the reach of the reports here. The principal con-
tribution of comparative study is to suggest some of the factors to which
we should direct our inquiry.
One of the first factors to be considered is whether participation is
direct or through elected representatives. Although decisions above
the local level are normally made by representatives, there may be im-
portant exceptions. Except for France and Sweden, in all of the coun-
tries reporting, the calling of strikes is generally submitted to a mem-
bership vote; this is legally required in Argentina, Chile, Korea, and
Germany. Collective agreements, however, are seldom submitted to the
members for ratification with the exception of Hungary and the
United States. Only rarely, as in Switzerland and sometimes in the
United States, are decisions of the national union made in its congress
subject to referenda; but where unions lack strong national organiza-
tions as in Chile or Korea, they may show a high level of direct de-
mocracy.
A second and closely related factor is the remoteness of the decision-
making from the individual members. Decisions made at the local
level are more likely to be made by direct vote of the members after
face to face discussion in a local meeting. Even if the decisions are made
by officers or delegate bodies, the individual will still have more ability
to make his views known and felt. But as decisions are made at upper
levels of the union structure, the individual's voice fades and his sense
of insignificance grows. This same factor might be expressed in terms
of the distribution of power betwen local and central governing bodies
of the union. In some countries, such as Germany, the local organiza-
tion is often weak, and power is centralized in the national union; in
others, such as Belgium and Sweden, the national union dominates,
but local branches have meaningful functions; in Yugoslavia, there has
been a deliberate effort to decentralize unions to get them closer to
the members. Even within a single country, unions may vary. Thus,
in the United States, the mine workers are more centralized than the
carpenters, and the steelworkers more centralized than the auto workers.
In studying this factor, it is most important to look beyond the for-
mal structure to see where the power is really exercised. For example,
in both England and Sweden the national unions negotiate national
agreements; the practical ability of local branches to alter or ignore the
terms of the national agreement, however, is significantly different in
the two countries. Even though the national union has certain powers,
traditions of local autonomy may inhibit their use. In this area the
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law plays no overt role, for in no country has the law attempted to regu-
late the allocation of power within the union structures. The cases and
statutes in the United States may tend to favor local autonomy by pro-
tecting the local against being taken over arbitrarily by the national
union. French decisions upholding the right of a subordinate unit to
secede by majority vote may also give the local a measure of independ-
ence from the national union. These instances, however, have at best
slight effect on the distribution of power and the remoteness of deci-
sion-making from the membership.
A third factor affecting the individual's right to participate is the
responsiveness of the union election process to the desires of the mem-
bers. Distortion through fraud in counting the ballots is the least sig-
nificant element; it is extremely rare in practice with but a few in-
stances known in the United States and one notable instance in the
Electrical Trades Union in England. A much more important element
is the directness of the election. In Belgium, for example, the local
section elects an executive committee which in turn selects delegates
to the regional section. This body then selects delegates to the national
committee which is responsible for the selection of national officers.
Participation through such an indirect election process muffles the
voice of the member. In contrast, some unions in the United States pro-
vide for direct election of national officers by the membership. Re-
sponsiveness may be further deadened by the lack of any significant
opposition or of widespread campaigning for office. Open contests for
national union offices are practically unknown in some countries and
are not common in any. Contests at the local level are more typical.
These elections may provide the occasion for criticizing the incumbent
officers' performance and policies, but the importance of this practice
depends heavily upon the importance of decisions to be made at the
local level.
The national reports bear melancholy reminders of how closely
unions commonly conform to Michel's classical "iron law of oligarchy"
in political parties. Unions, particularly at the national level, are
largely controlled by a one-party bureaucratic structure which swallows
or stifles all organized opposition. The bureaucracy is able to per-
petuate itself in power by its advantages in access to information, con-
trol over channels of communication, and disciplined organization.
Although the officers are practically irremovable, the voices of the
members do not necessarily go totally unheard. The officers normally
conceive of themselves as democratic leaders, not oligarchic rulers, and
are conscientiously concerned with fulfilling the wishes of their mem-
bers. In addition, union officers often feel far less secure than they are,
in fact, and are consequently sensitive to criticism and anxious to
placate dissatisfied groups.
Within this context we can begin to see more clearly the relevance
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of certain individual rights to the basic right to participate. The right
of the union member to be fully informed concerning his union's
affairs is not merely for the purpose of enabling him to discover wrong-
doing. Far more important is his ability to know the policies and per-
formances of the officers so that he can offer meaningful criticism and
suggestions. The right of the member to speak freely serves both to in-
form and arouse other members and to make officers aware of the
reasons for dissatisfaction. The right to organize opposition groups
within the union permits members who disagree with certain policies
to make themselves heard and their weight felt rather than being dis-
missed as isolated malcontents. Although these rights are not overtly
denied by unions, there still remains the question as to what extent
unions affirmatively encourage the exercise of these rights by keeping
members fully informed. Rather than managing the news, to what
degree are normal channels of communication, including union pub-
lications, made available to those who criticize the present leadership;
and to what degree is organized opposition within the union's political
process recognized and treated as entirely legitimate?
In the United States the recent LMRDA has as its central purpose
protection of the right to participate. To this end it has guaranteed the
right to speak freely, to form groups with other members, to participate
in union meetings, to nominate candidates and work for their election,
and to vote one's choice by secret ballot. In addition, the law has sought
to reduce the advantage held by incumbent officers in election contests.
Thus, every candidate has a right to have campaign material mailed to
all of the members, and is entitled to equal access to the list of union
members with their addresses. The law also prohibits the use of any
union members with their addresses. The law also prohibits the use of
any union funds to promote or aid in the candidacy of any person in a
union election, thereby limiting among other things, the use of the
union newspaper as a campaign organ for incumbent officers who seek
reelection. These limited measures will not repeal Michel's "iron law of
oligarchy," but they may give those who seek to change the union's
policies or leadership an increased ability to present these issues to the
membership and obtain a vote that more fully reflects the breadth of
dissatisfaction. This will make the right to participate more meaning-
ful by enhancing each member's opportunity to make his desires
known.
D. The Right to Fair Procedures in Union Tribunals
The union as a self-governing institution engages in both the legis-
lating of interests and the adjudicating of rights within the union.
When the union undertakes to adjudicate rights, the question is im-
mediately presented as to whether the union's procedures are appro-
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priate for the determination of those rights. The problem is clearly
posed and acknowledged in expulsion cases, but many other rights
are also adjudicated by union officers or bodies. The problem of appro-
priate procedure arises when the union decides who shall be entitled
to a pension, to sick pay, to strike benefits, or even to legal aid in en-
forcing claims against the employer. These are substantial rights which
are not to be given or denied by chance or favoritism. Determination
of disputes concerning the validity of elections, the right to particular
offices, the liability for certain dues and assessments, or the constitu-
tional power of certain officers or union bodies also raise procedural
problems.
The individual's right to a fair hearing when expulsion is involved
is readily recognized even though that right is not always protected.
But the importance of guaranteeing a fair procedure when these other
rights are adjudicated is often overlooked. As pointed out earlier,
many disciplinary procedures manifest serious weaknesses; they are
often devoid of even the most elementary safeguards to insure fairness.
This is not to suggest that all adjudications must be pressed into the
same procedural pattern, or that all legal systems must rely on the same
safeguards. But questions do arise when union procedures wholly fail
to meet those standards which would be expected if government
agencies were adjudicating similar rights.
The most serious problem arises out of the lack of any regularly
constituted judicial structure within the union. Union tribunals are
seldom separate organs but are simply the politically selected officers
wearing judicial caps. Appeals are to other officers at a higher level
in the political hierarchy. Political considerations may intrude; yet
even if they do not, the individual may have reason to doubt whether
his right has been adjudicated objectively and fairly. The awareness of
this special problem is reflected in some of the national reports. In
Sweden, most union constitutions provide that if a member is expelled
or any other internal dispute arises between the union, a local branch,
an officer, or a member, it should be referred to arbitration. Union rules
in Belgium usually provide a final appeal to arbitration; the same is
true of some Swiss unions. In the United States, the auto workers have
created a special appeals tribunal known as a Public Review Board
made up entirely of neutral persons outside the union. Its explicit
purpose is to provide an independent body to whom members can
appeal from decisions of union officers. A few smaller United States
unions have established similar bodies, but most have rejected this
device as allowing "outsiders" to meddle in union affairs. In two other
instances members who proposed public review boards have found
themselves expelled for "unbecoming conduct," their expulsions being
upheld by appeals tribunals composed of union officers.
The law, it seems commonly accepted, requires that the individual
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be given a fair hearing in discipline cases. However, in countries other
than England and the United States the requirement of fairness seems
to lack specific content for there has developed no body of decisions.
Nor is it clear to what other determinations this requirement of fair-
ness applies. In expulsion cases, when members of the tribunal are
obviously hostile or biased, the courts in England and the United
States have invalidated the procedure. Even these courts, however, have
been unable to reach the more subdued unfairness which can arise
from the inherent political nature of the tribunal.
E. Rights in Union Funds
In all of the reporting countries union members have relatively
direct control over the fixing of dues and relatively remote control over
the use of union funds. Union dues are almost always governed by the
national congress or local meeting but expenditures and investments
are determined by the officers or committees. In Belgium and Ger-
many, union finances are not fully disclosed in fear that this will enable
employers to gauge the union's strength. As a result the union member
is handicapped in even knowing how funds are handled, much less
exercising any indirect control. In other countries such as England,
Sweden, and Switzerland, unions give full reports to their members
even though this information comes into the hands of employers.
Union finances present no substantial problems in France, however.
Most members feel no obligation to pay their dues regularly or in full,
and as a result the relative poverty of unions means that funds at best
are meagre.
Legal controls over finances tend to be greater than over any other
phase of union affairs. In South American countries, state control may
be nearly complete. In Brazil, for instance, unions are financed by a
state-imposed tax on all workers within the union's jurisdiction; ex-
penditures are closely supervised. In Argentina, union funds are super-
vised by the Ministry of Labor; and in Chile, expenditures and in-
vestments are regulated by legislation. The thrust of the law in these
countries is to prescribe the purposes for which union funds may be
used and to circumscribe the members' power of self-government. The
law in England presses in the opposite direction-it insists that the de-
cisions of the members, made through their process of self-government,
be followed. An increase in dues levied by the officers without taking a
ballot as required by the rule book is invalid, and expenditures made
in violation of the union's rules or regularly made decisions will be
prohibited. In addition, union members have a legal right to inspect
union books of account to determine whether the union's rules and
decisions are being followed. To aid in making this inspection, mem-
bers are entitled to use outside experts capable of making the necessary
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search and analysis. If an officer is found to have paid out money im-
properly, an individual member may obtain a court order requiring
him to restore the amount to the union treasury. The law in the United
States gives the individual substantially the same rights in this regard
as in England.
Even where the law proceeds from the premise that its role is to
reinforce the union's self-government of its financial affairs, the ques-
tion remains whether the law places limits on the union's rules.
Clearly, the right of union members to inspect union records as recog-
nized in England and the United States is one such limit on union self-
government, for the member has this right regardless of the union's
rules. Another such limit is illustrated by the 1959 Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act in the United States. It made explicit
the prohibition against union officers from entering into any trans-
action which created a conflict of interest between his personal in-
terests and those of the union. The Statute also declared invalid any
provision in the union constitution relieving the officer from liability
for violating this fiduciary obligation. In cases where union members
have voted to appropriate union funds to pay the legal expenses of an
officer accused of misspending or embezzling union funds, the courts
have declared the action of the membership invalid, at least until the
officer has been found innocent. The significant point is that in this
specific area the democratic process is not fully relied upon to protect
the member's interest.
VII. UNION POLITICAL ACTION AND THE INDIVIDUAL
When a union engages in political action either by advocating cer-
tain governmental policies, supporting a political party or aiding the
election of particular candidates, it raises difficult questions of the
rights of individual members who may prefer other policies, belong
to other parties, or oppose those candidates supported by the union.
As has been emphasized earlier, the union exercises substantial control
over the economic welfare of the individual, and it is this power and
control of the union which makes membership in the union such a
valued and protected right. Questions arise when the union requires
the individual, as a condition of enjoying the rights of membership,
to adhere to the union's political program. If a union which has a
closed shop expels those who advocate different policies, the right to
work is conditioned on political conformity; and even in the absence
of a closed shop the member's interest in sick pay, pensions, or strike
benefits may compel him to silence. If a union gives funds to a political
party, an individual for whom the union bargains collectively is com-
pelled to contribute as a price for his right to participate in the de-
cisions which regulate his terms and conditions of employment.
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This states the problem in stark form but greatly oversimplifies it,
for the union's economic and political activities are seldom so neatly
separated. French unions, because of their economic weakness, have
commonly sought to achieve their economic objectives through legisla-
tion. Swiss unions, by contrast, have actively opposed legislation to in-
crease social benefits because they preferred to seek these through
economic action. In most countries, however, unions have used col-
lective bargaining and legislation as alternative paths to the same
objective. The relation between the union and the individual in this
political sphere also must be seen in the total political context of each
country. This includes the relationship between the union and the
political party and the role of both the union and the party in the
political structure. For example, in Switzerland the line between the
union and the political party seems clearly drawn, but in Sweden the
union and the party have traditionally been considered complementary
parts of a single labor movement. The national reports from Hungary
and Yugoslavia emphasize the divergent patterns possible in the rela-
tion between the union, the political party, and the state. Beyond the
competing interests of the individual and the union are basic considera-
tions of freedom of political action and debate, and the integrity of the
political process. A statement of the problem in full context for each
of the reporting countries is obviously not possible here. At most some
of the elements most directly related to the rights of the individual can
be suggested.
The impact on the rights of the individual is sharpest when the
union compels him to conform to its political beliefs or program.
Membership in a particular political party is not required by unions
in any of the reporting countries, even though the union may have a
close idealogical affinity and working relation with a political party.
Problems do arise, however, when individual members openly advocate
a position on a political issue opposite to that of the union. For ex-
ample, it is reported that in France, members of a teachers union were
disciplined because they opposed the union's view on state monopoly
of education; another union disciplined members who publicly dis.
approved of the union's views on the solution of the Algerian prob-
lem. In the United States, union members have been expelled for
petitioning the legislature to oppose a law the union supported, for
urging the election of a Republican candidate for President, and in
a recent case, for advocating legislation prohibiting union security
agreements. Whether the law will protect a member from such dis-
cipline is not completely clear in most countries, but the general
principles stated in a number of national reports would seem to pro-
hibit union restraints on the member's political freedom. The prin-
ciple and its application is most expressly stated in the Swiss Report.
There is now no serious doubt that such discipline is unlawful in the
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United States. Those who were expelled in the case above for advocat-
ing prohibition of all union security arrangements were subsequently
ordered restored to membership by the court; the free speech guaranty
in the LMRDA also gives added protection.
The requirement of political conformity may assume a more limited
form of exclusion with regards to those supporting groups considered
to be anti-democratic and, therefore, opposed to the union's basic pur-
poses. The legal reaction to such restraints is considerably less pro-
tective. Although Swiss law guards the members' political freedom,
the union is entitled to expel those whose political activity is directed
toward the establishment of a dictatorial regime. Similarly, courts in
the United States have upheld the expulsion of Communist Party
members and those supporting Communist activities. The difficult
problem arises in determining when a group's activities are so anti-
thetical to the union's purposes as to place them beyond the bounds of
protected political activity. The view of what is acceptable or tolerable
political action is obviously not the same in all countries and this is
inevitably reflected both in union practices and legal protections.
Far more common than requiring political conformity is requiring
financial support of the union's political program. Whether the money
spent for political purposes comes from the union's general fund or
from a special assessment, the member is required to contribute as a
condition of continued membership. Union political expenditures may
take three forms. The union may contribute directly to a political
party; it may help finance a candidate's election campaign; or it may
spend money advocating adoption of particular legislation. Unions in
the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), for example, make all
three forms of expenditures. They contribute to the Social Democrats
as a party, aid candidates in the Christian parties (Christian Democratic
Union and Christian Socialist Union) who are union representatives,
and promote a broad legislative program. Swiss unions, by contrast, are
limited largely to the third form of expenditure and any contribution
of union funds to a political party is flatly forbidden. At most, a union
may urge the election of a member who is a candidate for public office.
The complexity of the problem of protecting individual rights when
the union spends money for political purposes, and the varying degrees
of recognition given to those rights may be suggested by sketching the
devices and rules developed in Sweden, England, and the United
States.
The Swedish Confederation of Labor (CLO) and its member unions,
both at the national and local level, make substantial contributions
from their general funds to the Social Democrat party and particularly
to its campaign funds in election years. In addition, the unions support
a number of newspapers and an extensive educational program, both
of which help promote the union's political program. The question
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of individual rights, however, has not been centered on this use of
union funds but on the device of "collective affiliation." Local unions
may by majority vote "collectively affiliate" with the Social Democrat
party. Technically this means that every member of the local union
becomes a member of the party and pays his party dues through the
union which serves as collecting agent. In practice, the union simply
pays over to the party the amount equal to the party dues for the mem-
bers collectively affiliated, sometimes with no increase in the total dues
collected from the members. Although the practical effect is quite like
the union making contributions from the general funds, this is con-
sidered to raise a serious problem of individual rights for the dissent-
ing member. As a result, the union permits any member to avoid being
collectively affiliated by signing a reservation form. The individual is
then not listed as a party member, and the union is not to pay over
dues for him. Only in a few unions does the reserving member receive
back the amount of party dues, for it is feared that this would en-
courage reservations. The amount normally goes into the union's
general fund or for some other purpose. Over a third of all CLO mem-
bers are collectively affiliated, and of these about two per cent sign reser-
vation slips. The net effect of reservation, of course, is not to protect the
individual from being compelled to support the Social Democrat party
but only to permit him to assert that he is not a member of the party.
It should be mentioned that the Central Organization of Salaried Em-
ployees makes no contributions to political parties or candidates and has
no collective affiliation, but it does use union funds to promote its
political program.
The English system gives far more recognition to political dissenters
within the union. If a union wishes to contribute to a political party,
support candidates for office, organize political meetings or distribute
political literature, it must establish a separate fund. Such "party-
political" activities cannot be financed out of the union's general fund.
Any member who does not want to support the union's political
program can contract out by notifying the union. He is thereby ex-
cused from paying that portion of union dues which is allocated to the
special political fund. A member who contracts out cannot be excluded
from any benefits of the union, placed under any disability or dis-
criminated against in the union's other activities. Thus, he cannot be
barred from local union office, denied strike benefits or assessed dues
on a different basis. Over a million members, more than ten per cent of
all union members, have contracted out. The union can establish a
political fund only after a majority have voted by secret ballot to do so,
and the union's political fund rules must be approved by a government
officer, the Registrar of Friendly Societies who also enforces these rules.
Party-political purposes which can be financed only out of the special
fund do not include all political discussion. Thus, union newspapers
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and magazines can be financed from general funds if they are not pre-
dominately concerned with party-political matters. To this limited ex-
tent the individual may be compelled to help support advocacy of
political issues with which he disagrees.
In the United States, the rights of the individual are less clearly de-
fined, but are moving toward or beyond the extent of protection recog-
nized by the English rules. The Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 prohibited
unions from making any contribution, direct or indirect, in an election
for a federal office, but it did not regulate union contributions in state
and local elections. Thus, unions created special funds made up of
voluntary contributions to support candidates in national elections,
but continued to contribute from general funds in state and local
elections. The political parties could allocate their funds to offset
limitations placed on the use of union funds. The rationale of the
statute was that union funds could be used to discuss political issues,
advocate proposed legislation and promote a political program, but
that union funds could not be used to help elect particular candidates.
The line between political education and support of a candidate has
proven difficult to draw, however, and court decisions have tended to
confuse rather than clarify the legislation. There is serious doubt, then,
whether the Taft-Hartley Act has placed any practical limitations on
union political action or provided any effective protection for dis-
senters.
Of far greater practical importance are recent Supreme Court de-
cisions holding that a union cannot use funds exacted from a member
under a union security agreement to support political causes which the
individual opposes. The Court pointedly suggested that if a union
wished to use money for such purposes it could create a special fund as
unions do in England and exempt dissenting members from contribut-
ing that portion used for political expenditures. Two significant dif-
ferences, however, appear. First, the decision applies only where the
union has a security agreement. Thus, while the union cannot con-
dition an individual's right to work on his contributing to political
causes, the Court has not said that the union cannot condition his right
to participate in union decisions concerning collective bargaining on
his making such contributions. The rule is in principle, therefore, nar-
rower than that in England although in practice it applies to three-
fourths of all employees under collective agreements. Second, unlike
the English system, the expenditures to which the member may object
are broadly stated as those used for "political purposes" or to advance
"political causes"; these have also been described as expenditures "not
germane to collective bargaining." This probably puts much greater
restrictions on expenditures than the English rule, and forecloses a
union with a union security agreement from using general funds for
any form of political education or activity, and possibly, for expendi-
[Vp01. 18
HeinOnline  -- 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 276 1963-1964
INTERNAL RELATIONS: GENERAL REPORT
tures for any purposes other than those related to negotiation and ad-
ministration of the collective agreement.
These three countries represent, in one sense, the range of the spec-
trum of the reporting countries. Apparently in no country other than
Sweden are union members required to disavow their party member-
ship, and in no countries other than England and the United States
are union members legally protected from being required to help sup-
port political causes. This, however, is obviously not a meaningful
comparison. In countries such as Belgium or France, where competing
unions represent opposing political viewpoints, the individual may
have as much freedom of choice, in practical terms, as to what political
causes he supports as in England. On the other hand, there is reason
to believe that the political conformity imposed on union members in
some countries and the compulsion on them to support a particular
party is far more oppressive than the technical collective affiliation in
Sweden. This again emphasizes the necessity of not viewing the rela-
tion between the union and the individual solely in legal and formal
terms, but of seeing that relation in the context of the industrial and
political society of which it is a part.
VIII. SUMMARY
This general report has not attempted to explore all aspects of the
relationship between the union and its members. Interesting legal
problems which have been carefully analyzed in the national reports
have not been touched, e.g., the legal status of the union and its ability
to sue and be sued in the courts; the liability of the member for acts
of the union and the right of the member to union assets; and the
requirements that a union obtain a charter from the state, register,
or meet other standards to have legal existence. These are troublesome
problems in every country and comparative analysis would be in-
triguing and suggestive, but this must wait until another day.
The purpose of this report has not been to make a systematic com-
parison of the relation between the union and its members in the
twelve reporting countries. I am not persuaded that such a systematic
comparison is particularly useful, and I have serious doubts whether it
is possible. In each country the legal rules, the political institutions,
the collective bargaining systems and the union structures combine to
form unique patterns. The relation between the union and its mem-
bers must be examined in the context of a particular national pattern,
and shaped to fit the needs of that pattern. The problem of under-
standing the relationship in its full breadth and depth is of greatest
difficulty because of the multitude of complex elements which make
up the specific pattern. Examples drawn from the national reports help
us to identify some of these elements and see how they interact to form
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different patterns. The purpose of this general report has been simply
to suggest some lines of inquiry which might have general usefulness in
studying the relation between the union and its members and to indi-
cate some of the major factors which must be considered if that rela-
tionship is to be seen in its total context. It has not been an attempt to
analyze the relationship but to identify some of the factors necessary for
an analysis.
Implicit in the whole report is the strong conviction that our com-
mon and most compelling consideration is that in a modem industrial
society, and particularly one that seeks democratic goals, the trade-
union plays a crucial role. The very source of its significance is that it
speaks for and on behalf of a large number of citizens in governing
many aspects of their economic life. Therefore, the relationship be-
tween a union and its members is a vital element in the total social
process. Our larger concern, then, is not with the nature of the legal
relationship, but rather with the suitability of this social process. Thus,
the ultimate problem is to shape that relationship so that it helps and
not hinders us in achieving our democratic goals t
t This Report is reprinted here as it was given at the Congress in Lyon. Since pre-
paring the Report, the author has had an opportunity to study more intensively
problems of labor law and labor market institutions in the countries of the Com-
mon Market. Further study has reinforced his belief that the framework of analysis,
general conclusions, and the importance of the problem as presented here are es-
sentially sound. However, closer knowledge of the details would lead him to make
some minor alterations in detailed references to legal rules or practice in particular
countries.
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